The shifting sands of China’s “developing country” status

This post was originally written on January 6th, 2026

In an under-reported shock move, China has agreed to relinquish “developing country” status at the WTO. This has long been a demand of the U.S., and some observers may see this as a largely symbolic concession to a particularly belligerent White House — and one more concerned with appearances than substance. But I would argue that there is real substance here, and even the potential for a seismic shift.

Many treaties apply different standards to developed and developing countries, based on the idea that developed countries should bear more of the economic pain necessary to accomplish the treaty’s goals. This is the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), enshrined in the 1992 Rio Declaration and subsequent environmental treaties. In the environmental context, CBDR recognizes that developing countries bear the least responsibility for environmental degradation but face the greatest dangers from it. Implicitly, CBDR also views treaty compliance as an economic burden — one that should not be shared equally by rich and poor. (This is not the case with restrictions on plastic, whose production imposes huge environmental and health costs and few benefits, but the thinking is deeply ingrained). The degree of differentiation varies widely: in the Montreal Protocol, developing countries are subject to a slightly slower phaseout schedule; whereas under the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries were essentially exempt from any meaningful restrictions.

CBDR, as a foundational principle of international environmental law, must be included in the plastics treaty. But how it is implemented is very much an open question. I have previously argued that the plastics treaty must avoid the disastrous mistake of the climate change convention and focus CBDR on ensuring adequate transfer payments to developing countries. In contrast, Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s largest plastic producers, has demanded license to increase plastic production without limits. (The irony of oil-soaked Saudi Arabia pleading poverty as an excuse to drown the world in plastic is lost on no one except possibly the Saudis themselves). China, the world’s largest plastic producer, has been more circumspect in the treaty negotiations. It has signaled its opposition to production caps but has also clearly stated that the treaty must control plastic along its entire lifecycle.

So what are the implications of China’s WTO move for the plastics treaty? Perhaps none — there is no formal link between the WTO and the treaty negotiations. But it would be strange for China to be classified as a developing country, entitled to CBDR permissiveness, under the plastics treaty when it has foregone that status under the WTO. Dropping the veil of developing country status would put the metastatic growth of the Chinese plastic industry squarely in the spotlight. Unlike its counterparts in Europe and South Korea, which are facing long-term, structural declines, the petrochemical industry in China continues to build at a breakneck pace, far outstripping the ability of markets to absorb its demand.

Restraining the growth of a powerful industry is always politically difficult, and this is a major function of international treaties: treaties provide political support to national leaders who must face down their own vested interests. In relinquishing developing country status at the WTO, China’s government sent a signal to its domestic industries: they can no longer expect cosseted treatment and must compete on a level playing field with foreign firms. Will this even-handedness apply to the plastic industry as well? If so, China’s WTO move might be the first signal of a willingness to rein in its own petrochemical industry.

The idea isn’t so far-fetched. China can’t rely on a domestic market to sell increasing quantities of plastic: its population is shrinking and already drowning in plastic. Export markets don’t look much better. Africa, China’s preferred economic partner these days, has clearly signaled through the treaty negotiations that it does not wish to be the world’s repository for plastic. Reducing plastic production and pollution is also high on the list of priorities for the Pacific small island states, which China is trying to woo for geostrategic regions. So although China’s plastic production continues to expand, much of that capacity may go unused. China might be persuaded that a managed contraction of the industry is better than an unmanaged collapse.

There is a real opportunity here for ambitious action on plastics. To capitalize on it, ambitious countries need to talk directly with China, to see how far it is willing to go — to negotiate, in other words. Rather than wasting time on intransigent countries that have no interest in a treaty, it’s time to engage the world’s largest plastic producer. Because the ground is shifting.

Photo Credit: “sand ripples” by matthew venn, CC BY-SA 2.0